Too bad for the country, George W. Bush does not reach to the council of elders within his father administration.

The article listed appeared in the NYT editorial page on January 4th. President George H.W.Bush has some great leaders and thinkers within his circles of advisors unlike his son who does not have one single person that can rise to a serious intellectual, let alone a thinker or a philosopher with a vision for the future. Too bad for America first and too bad for President George W. Bush that he did not reach to his father for help, instead relied on "stupid" think tanks in Washington to get him in the mess in the first place and to keep him in the mess when he needed to get out. More disgusting is the photo posting in todays electronic Haaretz, the Israeli paper, of Secretary Roce smiling next to that racist, facist Maldovian Jew, Avigdor Lieberman, who not only advocate the expulsion and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from their home land of Palestine, but who also advocate the wholesale murder and assasination of Palestinians and of course, with the objective of stealing their lands. Standing and smiling with that racist Jew, Perhaps Secretary Rice has some message to the Palestininans. I wonder what someone as racists as Avigdor Lieberman thinks of Blacks?
Sami Jadallah

From the New York Times
January 4, 2007
Op-Ed Contributor

Getting the Middle East Back on Our Side
By BRENT SCOWCROFT
Washington

THE Iraq Study Group report was released into a sea of unrealistic
expectations. Inevitably, it disappointed hopes for a clear path through the
morass of Iraq, because there is no "silver bullet" solution to the
difficulties in which we find ourselves.

But the report accomplished a great deal. It brought together some of
America's best minds across party lines, and it outlined with clarity and
precision the key factors at issue in Iraq. In doing so, it helped catalyze
the debate about our Iraq policy and crystallize the choices we face. Above
all, it emphasized the importance of focusing on American national
interests, not only in Iraq but in the region.

However, the report, which calls the situation in Iraq "grave and
deteriorating," does not focus on what could be the most likely outcome of
its analysis. Should the Iraqis be unable or unwilling to play the role
required of them, the report implies that we would have no choice but to
withdraw, and then blame our withdrawal on Iraqi failures. But here the
report essentially stops.

An American withdrawal before Iraq can, in the words of the president,
"govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself" would be a strategic
defeat for American interests, with potentially catastrophic consequences
both in the region and beyond. Our opponents would be hugely emboldened, our
friends deeply demoralized.

Iran, heady with the withdrawal of its principal adversary, would expand its
influence through Hezbollah and Hamas more deeply into Syria, Lebanon, the
Palestinian territories and Jordan. Our Arab friends would rightly feel we
had abandoned them to face alone a radicalism that has been greatly inflamed
by American actions in the region and which could pose a serious threat to
their own governments.

The effects would not be confined to Iraq and the Middle East. Energy
resources and transit choke points vital to the global economy would be
subjected to greatly increased risk. Terrorists and extremists elsewhere
would be emboldened. And the perception, worldwide, would be that the
American colossus had stumbled, was losing its resolve and could no longer
be considered a reliable ally or friend — or the guarantor of peace and
stability in this critical region.

To avoid these dire consequences, we need to secure the support of the
countries of the region themselves. It is greatly in their self-interest to
give that support, just as they did in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict.
Unfortunately, in recent years they have come to see it as dangerous to
identify with the United States, and so they have largely stood on the
sidelines.

A vigorously renewed effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict could
fundamentally change both the dynamics in the region and the strategic
calculus of key leaders. Real progress would push Iran into a more defensive
posture. Hezbollah and Hamas would lose their rallying principle. American
allies like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the gulf states would be liberated to
assist in stabilizing Iraq. And Iraq would finally be seen by all as a key
country that had to be set right in the pursuit of regional security.

Arab leaders are now keen to resolve the 50-year-old dispute. Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert of Israel may be as well. His nation's long-term security can
only be assured by resolving this issue once and for all. However, only the
American president can bring them to the same table.

Resuming the Arab-Israeli peace process is not a matter of forcing
concessions from Israel or dragooning the Palestinians into surrender. Most
of the elements of a settlement are already agreed as a result of the
negotiations of 2000 and the "road map" of 2002. What is required is to
summon the will of Arab and Israeli leaders, led by a determined American
president, to forge the various elements into a conclusion that all parties
have already publicly accepted in principle.

As for Syria and Iran, we should not be afraid of opening channels of
communication, but neither should we rush to engage them as negotiating
"partners." Moreover, these two countries have differing interests,
expectations and points of leverage and should not be treated as though they
are indistinguishable.

Syria cannot be comfortable clutched solely in the embrace of Iran, and thus
prying it away may be possible. Syria also has much to gain from a
settlement with Israel and internal problems that such a deal might greatly
ease. If we can make progress on the Palestinian front before adding Syria
to the mix, it would both avoid overloading Israel's negotiating capacity
and increase the incentives for Damascus to negotiate seriously.

Iran is different. It may not be wise to make Iran integral to the regional
strategy at the outset. And the nuclear issue should be dealt with on a
separate track. In its present state of euphoria, Iran has little interest
in making things easier for us. If, however, we make clear our
determination, and if the other regional states become more engaged in
stabilizing Iraq, the Iranians might grow more inclined to negotiate
seriously.

WHILE negotiations on the Arab-Israel peace process are under way, we should
establish some political parameters inside Iraq that encourage moves toward
reconciliation and unified government in Iraq. Other suggested options, such
as an "80 percent solution" that excludes the Sunnis, or the division of the
country into three parts, are not only inconsistent with reconciliation but
would almost certainly pave the way to broader regional conflict and must be
avoided.

American combat troops should be gradually redeployed away from intervening
in sectarian conflict. That necessarily is a task for Iraqi troops, however
poorly prepared they may be. Our troops should be redirected toward training
the Iraqi Army, providing support and backup, combating insurgents,
attenuating outside intervention and assisting in major infrastructure
protection.

That does not mean the American presence should be reduced. Indeed, in the
immediate future, the opposite may be true, though any increase in troop
strength should be directed at accomplishing specific, defined missions. A
generalized increase would be unlikely to demonstrably change the situation
and, consequently, could result in increased clamor for withdrawal. But the
central point is that withdrawing combat forces should not be a policy
objective, but rather, the result of changes in our strategy and success in
our efforts.

As we work our way through this seemingly intractable problem in Iraq, we
must constantly remember that this is not just a troublesome issue from
which we can walk away if it seems too costly to continue. What is at stake
is not only Iraq and the stability of the Middle East, but the global
perception of the reliability of the United States as a partner in a deeply
troubled world. We cannot afford to fail that test.
-------------------------
* Brent Scowcroft was national security adviser to Presidents Gerald R. Ford
and George H. W. Bush. He is now president of the Forum for International
Policy.